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Protection for Owners under the Law 
on Adverse Possession: An Inconsistent 
Use Test or a Qualified Veto System? 
UNA WOODS* 
This article will assess the case for reforming the Irish law on adverse possession to confer 
additional protection on the owner. Assuming such reform is warranted, it is possible that 
an existing judicial solution, known as the rule in Leigh v Jack, has already been devised. 
Ontario’s experience with an equivalent rule, known as the inconsistent use test, is of 
interest in this context and certain academic literature is discussed which explains why the 
inconsistent use test was developed and argues in favour of its retention or resurrection. An 
alternative model of protection is then analyzed: the English Qualified Veto System of adverse 
possession introduced by the Land Registration Act 2002. I argue that a judicial or legislative 
reincarnation of the rule in Leigh v Jack would be an extremely flawed method of reforming 
the law in jurisdictions, such as Ireland, which are considering reform, as the Qualified Veto 
System more effectively responds to the difficulties which the inconsistent use test appears 
to be attempting to resolve. I conclude that such a Qualified Veto System, similar, although 
not identical to the one introduced in England, should be introduced in Ireland. 
* Professor, School of Law, University of Limerick, Ireland. 
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THE INCONSISTENT USE TEST or, its English ancestor, the rule in Leigh v Jack,1 
has been the target of much judicial and academic criticism since its inception.2 
Although the English House of Lords has defnitively rejected the rule in Leigh 
v Jack—Lord Browne-Wilkinson referring to it as “heretical and wrong”3—its 
status elsewhere remains less certain. For example, whether the rule still forms 
1. (1879), 5 Ex D 264 [Leigh v Jack]. 
2. For criticism of the inconsistent use test, see Teis v Ancaster (Town), 1997 ONCA 1688 at 
para 24 [Teis]; Bradford Investments (1963) Ltd v Fama (2005), 77 OR (3d) 127 at para 
100 (Ont Sup Ct) [Bradford]; Brian Bucknall, “Two Roads Diverged: Recent Decisions 
on Possessory Title” (1984) 22 Osgoode Hall LJ 375. For criticism of the rule in Leigh 
v Jack, see Seamus Durack Manufacturing Ltd v Considine, [1987] IR 677 (Ir) [Seamus 
Durack]; Buckinghamshire County Council v Moran, [1989] EWCA Civ 11; JA Pye (Oxford) 
Ltd v Graham, [2002] UKHL 30 [JA Pye 2002]; Martin Dockray, “Adverse Possession 
and Intention-II” (1982) Te Conveyancer 345 at 346-47; Adam Cloherty & David 
Fox, “Heresies and Human Rights” (2005) 64 Cambridge LJ 558. Te Irish Law Reform 
Commission has twice recommended the introduction of statutory clarifcation that it does 
not apply. See Ireland, Te Law Reform Commission, Report on Land Law and Conveyancing 
Law: General Proposals, LRC 30-1989 (Te Law Reform Commission, 1989) at paras 52-53; 
Ireland, Te Law Reform Commission, Consultation Paper on Reform and Modernisation 
of Land Law and Conveyancing Law, LRC CP 34-2004 (Law Reform Commission, 
2004) at para 2.04. 
3. JA Pye 2002, supra note 2. 
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part of Irish law is a matter of debate.4 Moreover, the inconsistent use test has 
enjoyed an unparalleled revival in certain parts of Canada, particularly in Ontario, 
leading one commentator to describe it as a functional substitute for the civil law 
concept of interversion.5 
Te rule in Leigh v Jack is named after an English Court of Appeal decision 
delivered in 1879 and is attributed to Lord Justice Bramwell who declared:6 
in order to defeat a title by dispossessing the former owner, acts must be done 
which are inconsistent with his enjoyment of the soil for the purposes for which he 
intended to use it: that is not the case here, where the intention of the plaintif and 
her predecessors in title was not either to build upon or to cultivate the land, but to 
devote it at some future time to public purposes. 
While the rule held sway in England and Wales,7 it was applicable if the owner 
had a plan to use the land for some specifc purpose in the future and, in the 
meantime, some other person took physical possession of it.8 Te rule prevented 
adverse possession from taking place if the adverse possessor’s current use was 
not inconsistent with the owner’s future plan for the property. In contrast, the 
inconsistent use test appears to play a more important role in adverse possession 
claims. Te courts apply it in a more universal fashion, for example, if the owner 
has an existing, although limited purpose (as opposed to a future plan) for the 
land.9 In such circumstances, its current use must be inconsistent with the 
owner’s existing purpose for the land to qualify as adverse possession. It could be 
argued that this extension of the inconsistent use requirement is facilitated by a 
literal reading of Lord Justice Bramwell’s original dictum in Leigh v Jack which 
4. Tere are conficting High Court decisions. See Cork Corporation v Lynch, [1995] 2 ILRM 
598 (Ir); Seamus Durack, supra note 2. Buckley argues that the rule in Leigh v Jack continues 
to play a role in Irish law. See Niall Buckley, “Adverse Possession at the Crossroads” (2006) 
11 Conveyancing & Prop LJ 3 at 59, 64. In contrast, Woods argues that it cannot be 
confdently asserted that the rule forms part of Irish law. See Una Woods, “Te Position 
of the Owner under the Irish Law on Adverse Possession” (2008) 30 Dublin U LJ 298 at 
317-22 [Woods 2008]. 
5. See Michael H Lubetsky, “Adding Epicycles: Te Inconsistent Use Test in Adverse Possession 
Law” (2009) 47 Osgoode Hall LJ 497 at 525-27. 
6. Leigh v Jack, supra note 1 at 273. 
7. For a description of the evolution of the rule in England and Wales, see Woods 2008, supra
note 4 at 314-17. 
8. See the explanation of the case law (following Leigh v Jack put forward by Sir John 
Pennycuick) in Treloar v Nute. See Treloar v Nute, [1976] 1 WLR 1295 at 1300-01 [Treloar]. 
9. Katz comments: “Te inconsistent user test is typically applied in resolving a contest 
between a deliberate squatter and an owner-occupier.” See Larissa Katz, “Te Moral 
Paradox of Adverse Possession: Sovereignty and Revolution in Property Law” (2010) 55 
McGill LJ 47 at 68. 
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requires, “acts to be done which are inconsistent with his enjoyment of the soil 
for the purposes for which he intended to use it.”10 It is worth noting however 
that, in England, a similar interpretation of the rule, known as “the doctrine of 
necessary inconvenience,” made only a brief appearance in the case law before 
it was rejected.11 
A persistent, although sporadic theme which has emerged in law reform 
and judicial circles across the common law world in recent decades has been 
the fairness of the doctrine of adverse possession. A principal concern relates 
to the doctrine’s failure to confer adequate protection on owners against the 
danger of inadvertently losing title by adverse possession. In addition, critics 
have emphasized the extent to which it permits squatters who know they do not 
own the land (i.e., deliberate or “bad faith” squatters) to acquire title.12 Te Irish 
law on adverse possession has not escaped this controversy. Te Law Reform 
Commission in a report published in 2005 noted, “it appears to exact a very 
severe penalty on a landowner (the loss of the land) through a mere oversight or 
10. Leigh v Jack, supra note 1 at 273. 
11. Dockray maintains that Justice Slade applied this approach in reaching his decision in 
Powell v McFarlane, (1977) 38 P & CR 452 [Powell]. See also Dockray, supra note 2 at 
349-50. However, Powell can also be explained on the basis that the intruder’s user was 
equivocal and did not amount to possession in the absence of an intention to dispossess 
the owner. See Stephen Jourdan & Oliver Radley-Gardner, Adverse Possession, 2nd ed 
(Bloomsbury Professional, 2012) at para 9.88. See also Treloar, supra note 8. In Treloar 
v Nute, the Appellate Court held it was not permissible to import into the defnition of 
adverse possession a requirement that the owner had to be inconvenienced or otherwise 
afected by that possession. It was held that Leigh v Jack, and the cases that followed, could 
be distinguished as in those cases the owner had future plans for the property. In the absence 
of plans for such a special purpose, time began to run from such taking of possession 
irrespective of whether the plaintif sufered inconvenience from the possession. 
12. Media coverage of adverse possession cases tends to be negative. See O’Hagan (Personal 
Representative of Alice Dolan, deceased) v Grogan, [2012] IESC 8 (Ir). See also Tim Healy, 
“Squatter wins rights to widow’s house 30 years after he broke in,” Irish Independent (17 
February 2012), online: <www.independent.ie/irish-news/squatter-wins-rights-to-widows-
house-30-years-after-he-broke-in-26822629.html> [perma.cc/PSZ2-WY3Z]. Similarly, 
the English adverse possession case, R (Best) v Chief Land Registrar, [2015] EWCA Civ 17, 
attracted critical media commentary. See Paul Bracchi & Stephanie Condron, “How the 
Squatter Who ‘Stole’ a Pensioner’s Tree-Bedroom House with the Blessing of the Law Will 
Cost You £250,000,” Te Daily Mail (22 May 2016), online: <www.dailymail.co.uk/news/ 
article-3601741/Squatter-stole-pensioner-s-three-bedroom-house-blessing-law-cost-250-000. 
html> [perma.cc/QK3Z-VM7L]. 
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mistake.”13 Part I of this article examines the argument for the introduction of 
reform to Irish law on adverse possession designed specifcally to confer additional 
protection on the owner against the danger of losing title through the operation 
of the doctrine. Certain empirical evidence is presented to demonstrate the need 
to safeguard the position of owners and hone the operation of the doctrine so 
that only “deserving” adverse possessors would be in a position to rely on the 
doctrine in Ireland.14 
Assuming for the moment that the owner does require additional protection 
under the Irish law on adverse possession, it is possible that an existing, although 
ostensibly outmoded, judicial solution has already been devised. In 2006, Niall 
Buckley made a case for the retention of the rule in Leigh v Jack to ensure more 
robust protection for the property rights of the owner.15 It is worth considering 
whether Ireland can learn from Ontario’s experience with the inconsistent use test 
in this regard. Part II of this article critiques certain literature which explains why 
the inconsistent use test was developed and argues in favour of its retention or 
resurrection. Larissa Katz maintained that the adoption of an “inconsistent use” 
model of adverse possession permits the radical transformation of squatters into 
owners without collapsing into a moral paradox where the law appears to reward 
the theft of land.16 Katz believes that this approach recognizes the authority of the 
owner to set an agenda for the land and remain the owner without maintaining 
possession, but also flls a vacancy in ownership where the owner is no longer 
exercising their authority and the land has become agenda-less. Tis article 
seeks to determine, from the Canadian experience, whether the application of 
the inconsistent use test represents a regressive, heretical step or an inspired 
judicial development.17 
13. Ireland, Te Law Reform Commission, Report on Reform and Modernisation of Land Law 
and Conveyancing Law, LRC 74-2005 (Te Law Reform Commission, 2005) at para 2.06 
[Reform and Modernisation Report]. It also recognized the unfair operation of the doctrine 
when it enables a person, who deliberately sets out to take advantage of it, to use it as a 
means of obtaining ownership of someone else’s land without paying any compensation. 
14. I discuss briefy this concept of the “deserving” and the “undeserving” adverse possessor in 
Part III of this article. For a more detailed discussion, see Una Woods, “Te ‘Undeserving’ 
and the ‘Deserving’ Squatter under the Irish Law on Adverse Possession” in Bjorn Hoops & 
Ernst J Marais, eds, New Perspectives on Acquisitive Prescription (Eleven International, 2019) 
[Woods, “Te Undeserving and Deserving Squatter”]. 
15. Buckley, supra note 4 at 64. 
16. Katz, supra note 9. 
17. Lord Browne-Wilkinson described the notion that sufciency of possession can depend on 
the intention of the true owner as “heretical and wrong.” See JA Pye 2002, supra note 2. 
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Part III of the article examines an alternative reform option and discusses the 
Qualifed Veto System of adverse possession introduced in England and Wales by 
the Land Registration Act 2002.18 Trough the implementation of this reform, the 
Law Commission purported to address both of the ethical concerns mentioned 
earlier.19 Additional protection is conferred on the registered owner who may veto 
an adverse possession application. However, the qualifcations to the veto system 
preserve the operation of the doctrine for certain adverse possessors (e.g., a good 
faith adverse possessor of boundary land) in the interest of fairness.20 I argue that 
a similar, but not identical, system of adverse possession should be introduced 
in Ireland, although lessons can be learned from the English experience in 
implementing such reform. I conclude by arguing that a judicial or legislative 
reincarnation of the rule in Leigh v Jack would be an extremely fawed method 
of reforming the law in jurisdictions, such as Ireland, which are still considering 
reform, particularly given the pragmatic alternative of introducing a qualifed 
veto system of adverse possession. 
I. THE CASE FOR ADDITIONAL PROTECTION FOR 
VULNERABLE OWNERS UNDER IRISH LAW 
A. SYMPATHY AND ANTIPATHY FOR THE OWNER 
A number of views have been expressed by law reform bodies in Ireland, Northern 
Ireland, and England and Wales on whether there is an ethical justifcation for 
reforming the law on adverse possession to more efectively protect the owner. 
Tese views have, in turn, been critiqued by academic commentators who have 
discussed whether the “typical” owner deserves additional protection or whether 
the law can, or should, accommodate such ethical concerns. In its report published 
in 2005, the Irish Law Reform Commission commented, “it must be recognized 
that on occasion the doctrine may operate unfairly.”21 It made particular reference 
to the doubts expressed by English courts about the compatibility of the doctrine 
of adverse possession with the European Convention on Human Rights. 
It recommended that, in the future, a person claiming title by adverse possession 
18. (UK), schedule 6 [Land Registration Act 2002]. 
19. United Kingdom, Law Commission, Land Registration for the Twenty-First Century: 
A Consultative Document, Law Com No 254 (HM Land Registry, 1998) at para 10.19 
[Law Com No 254]. 
20. Te Law Commission also claimed that these reforms were essential to ensure the 
compatibility of the doctrine of adverse possession with title registration principles. 
21. Reform and Modernisation Report, supra note 13 at para 2.06. 
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would have to obtain a court “vesting” order, which would only be available 
in specifed circumstances. Tese law reform proposals were clearly intended to 
provide added protection for the owner and to streamline the operation of the 
doctrine. In doing so, it would continue to apply only where necessary to restore 
the marketability of abandoned land, and in certain other limited circumstances. 
However, these particular proposed reforms were jettisoned in response to 
critical submissions made to the government by the Law Society’s Conveyancing 
Committee, mostly related to the workability of the proposed scheme.22 
It could be argued that the tenor of the Irish Law Reform Commission’s 
commentary, and its recommendations in this respect, represented a knee-jerk 
reaction to the Pye litigation, which was, at the time, gradually winding its way 
through the English courts. Te Pye case originated from an action brought by J.A. 
Pye (Oxford) Ltd. to recover possession of 25 hectares of land in Berkshire from 
the personal representatives of Michael Graham, who had been a neighbouring 
farmer and claimed to have established adverse possession of the land. When the 
House of Lords ruled in favour of the Grahams, Pye Ltd. proceeded to bring an 
application against the UK government pursuant to article 34 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights. Te company alleged that the law on adverse 
possession, through which it had lost land with development potential, violated 
its right to property as guaranteed by the Convention. On 30 August 2007, the 
Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights delivered its judgment 
in JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v United Kingdom.23 
It held by ten votes to seven that the English law on adverse possession, as set 
out in the Land Registration Act 1925 and the Limitation Act 1980, did not violate 
article 1 of the First Protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights, which 
protects property rights.24 Tis application represented a high point of disquiet 
in relation to the doctrine, and had implications for other contracting states. 
Indeed, the Irish government made a third party submission to the European 
22. Consequently, the Land and Conveyancing Law Reform Act 2009 (UK), emanating primarily 
from the recommendations made in the 2005 Report, was enacted without the inclusion of 
any reforms dealing with the law on adverse possession. For a discussion of these proposals, 
see Una Woods, Te Irish Law on Adverse Possession: Te Case for a Qualifed Veto System
(PhD Tesis, Queen’s University Belfast, 2015), ch 5 [unpublished] [Woods]. Te Land and 
Conveyancing Law Reform Act 2009 was enacted on 1 July 2009 and all of its provisions, with 
the exception of section 132, came into operation on 1 December 2009. Section 132 came 
into force on 28 February 2010. 
23. [2008] 1 EGLR 111 [JA Pye 2008]. 
24. Te judgment reversed the Chamber decision delivered on 15 November 2005 which found 
by four votes to three that there was a violation of the property rights guarantee. 
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Court of Human Rights, which emphasised the important functions performed 
by the doctrine in Ireland.25 Te Grand Chamber decision in JA Pye eliminated 
doubts over the acceptability of the English law on adverse possession from a 
human rights perspective and crushed any possibility that the Convention would 
act as a catalyst for the reform of the Irish law on adverse possession. It could 
be argued that the Grand Chamber decision also renders any anxiety in relation 
to the position of the owner redundant. One could say that it nullifes the case 
for the introduction of reforms to the doctrine in Ireland designed to confer 
additional protection on the owner.26 
In addition, it is interesting that a very diferent approach was taken in 
2010 by the Northern Ireland Law Commission to the ethical issues which have 
emerged in this area of law. While the Commission noted this development, 
it ultimately recommended that the law on adverse possession should not be 
reformed to accommodate ethical concerns.27 It also expressed the view that 
it was not appropriate “at this stage” to recommend a veto system of adverse 
possession of registered land for Northern Ireland.28 
As mentioned, the Law Commission of England and Wales justifed the 
reforms to the law on adverse possession introduced by the Land Registration 
Act 2002 by explaining that the qualifed veto system, in conferring additional 
protection on the registered owner and limiting the extent to which undeserving 
squatters can rely on the doctrine, strikes a fairer balance between the owner 
and the squatter.29 “Fairness” can be a nebulous concept which, like beauty, lies 
25. JA Pye 2008, supra note 23 at paras 50-51. 
26. It is worth bearing in mind that the Convention is designed to guarantee only a minimum 
standard of protection, particularly in areas, such as property law, where a broad margin 
of appreciation is aforded to Convention States. In addition, in a recent Irish Supreme 
Court decision, Justice Lafoy commented that the doctrine of adverse possession 
remains controversial and stated: “Tere would seem to be a need for a review of the 
recommendations made by the Law Reform Commission in 1989, 2002, and 2005 with a 
view to bringing clarity to the law in this area.” See Dunne v Iarnrd Éireann, [2016] IESC 47 
at para 23 (Ir). 
27. Ireland, Northern Ireland Law Commission, Supplementary Consultation Paper: Land Law, 
Adverse Possession, Ground Rents, Covenants after Redemption, NILC 3 (Northern Ireland 
Law Commission, 2010) at para 2.45 [Consultation Paper]; Ireland, Northern Ireland 
Law Commission, Report: Land Law, NILC 8 (Te Stationery Ofce, 2010) at paras 
12.6-12.7 [Report]. 
28. Ibid at paras 12.10-12.11. Consultation Paper, supra note 27 at para 2.56. It is interesting 
to note that it did not defnitively reject this as an option but noted that it would require 
a more in-depth analysis of the circumstances in which adverse possession takes place and 
whether such a system could be extended to unregistered land. 
29. Law Com No 254, supra note 19 at para 10.19. 
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in the eye of the beholder, and it is unsurprising that the Commission’s claim 
attracted some academic criticism. Fox and Cobb described the Commission’s 
fairness rationale as predicated on the assumption that, under the old regime, the 
owner who lost title was blameless.30 Tey strongly imply that the old adverse 
possession regime achieved a fairer result by punishing the (blameworthy) owner 
who neglected to monitor their property. Tey accuse the Law Commission of 
“moral essentialism” in its treatment of owners in formulating the proposals for 
the reforms, which were introduced by the Land Registration Act 2002.31 Teir 
central focus is the matter of forgotten properties and they note as follows:32 
For the Law Commission, the problem of forgotten properties was one for which 
landowners were regarded as blameless. … Te clear (and contentious) moral 
implication here—that landowners cannot rather than simply do not supervise their 
properties efectively—reinforces the view that they should not be punished for 
inadequate supervision by losing title to their land. Te LRA 2002 was specifcally 
designed to protect registered proprietors from the possibility of such oversight or 
inadvertence. 
Tey also point out that the Law Commission’s focus is on large landowners 
and assumes that all examples of oversight were not the fault of landowners, but 
rather an unavoidable consequence of the ownership of huge volumes of land 
spread across large areas. According to Lorna Fox and Neil Cobb, “it is arguable 
that many large landowners are in a better position fnancially to manage their 
property efectively and should therefore be expected to take much greater 
responsibility for surveillance.”33 Tey also note, “the challenges of efective 
supervision seem less acute for landowners of smaller tracts of land.”34 One of 
their main arguments is that landowners who fail to monitor their land are in 
breach of their duty of stewardship and, therefore, have a morally weaker claim 
to the property than an urban squatter who occupies it as a home. Tey state that 
30. Neil Cobb & Lorna Fox, “Living Outside the System? Te (Im)morality of Urban Squatting 
after the Land Registration Act 2002” (2007) 27 LS 236 at 236, 242. 
31. Ibid at 256. 
32. Ibid at 243-44, 257-59. Fox and Cobb also make an interesting point that as urban squatters 
(who are more concerned about the use value of the property than the acquisition of title) 
are now unlikely to make an adverse possession application to the land registry, the registered 
owners will not be notifed about such properties and they are likely to remain forgotten, 
possibly becoming dilapidated, with no possibility of being brought back onto the market. 
33. Ibid at 255. 
34. Ibid. 
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this duty of stewardship should include a fundamental obligation to engage in an 
appropriate degree of supervision over empty land.35 
In a recent article, which examines the case for the introduction of various 
reforms to the Irish law on adverse possession, John Wylie reiterates the concerns 
expressed by the Northern Irish Law Commission in relation to the dangers of 
incorporating an ethical dimension into the doctrine, noting that it is necessary 
to examine the ethical position of the owner if one begins to consider reforms 
designed to prevent less ethical applications by squatters.36 Wylie continues:37 
A proper ethical approach would involve weighing in the balance the respective 
merits of both the dispossessed owner and the squatter in each individual case. I 
have no hesitation in saying that devising a legislative scheme to achieve this which 
the courts would fnd satisfactory to operate would be extremely difcult, if not 
impossible. 
Te fact that Wylie’s views coincide with those expressed by the Northern Ireland 
Law Commission in 2010 is unsurprising as Professor Wylie was a member of the 
legal team engaged for that particular law reform project. 
It is axiomatic that owners who lose title through the operation of the doctrine 
may evoke sympathy or a sense of righteous indignation depending on whether 
they are perceived to be guilty of wrongdoing and their particular circumstances. 
On one end of this spectrum of blame/innocence, there is the owner who has 
completely abandoned their land and is guilty of wasting a valuable resource. 
On the other end, there is the epitome of the dutiful owner: someone who is 
unaware that adverse possession is taking place because the land in question can 
only be used for activities which are less obvious, even with regular monitoring.38 
Somewhere in between you have: (1) the owner who is unaware that they own 
the land or uncertain about the position of a boundary; (2) the owner who desires 
to retain the land but neglects to maintain or monitor it; and (3) the owner 
35. Ibid. 
36. See John Wylie, “Adverse Possession—Still an Ailing Concept?” (2017) 58 Ir Jur 1 at 12. 
While Wylie argues in favour of the introduction of reforms to more technical elements of 
the doctrine (e.g., the implementation of the parliamentary conveyance theory), he argues 
against the introduction of more fundamental structural reforms, for example, the abolition 
of the doctrine or the introduction of a qualifed veto system. 
37. Ibid at 14. 
38. Although legal experts appear to be divided on whether adverse possession must be 
“obvious,” I concur with the opinion of the Law Commission of England and Wales on this 
issue. In certain circumstances, adverse possession can take place without it being readily 
detectible, despite monitoring by the owner. See Law Com No 254, supra note 19 at paras 
5.46, 10.4. For further discussion, see Woods, supra note 22, ch 3, part 3. 
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who is aware that someone is in possession but neglects to enter into a formal 
arrangement with the occupier or take legal action to evict them. 
If the owner has no current use for the property but has future plans for it, 
an owner’s failure to act may seem more understandable, although a sympathetic 
reaction is not a foregone conclusion as the Pye litigation aptly illustrates. Te 
resigned reluctance of certain members of the judiciary at the domestic level 
to rule in favour of the adverse possessor, their sympathy for the owner, and 
their clear indications of dissatisfaction with the old adverse possession regime,39 
contrasts sharply with the references of the European Court of Human Rights to 
the culpability of the company in failing to regularize the Grahams’ occupation 
of the land or issue proceedings within the twelve year limitation period. Tis 
culpability was viewed by the European Court as particularly pronounced, given 
that the company was engaged in specialized professional real estate development 
and should be assumed to have knowledge of the law on adverse possession.40 
Conway and Stannard note that the public emotional response to the Pye
litigation was fairly muted, despite the amount of land at stake and its value. 
Tey speculate that reactions were probably infuenced by the fact that Pye Ltd. 
was a wealthy (and faceless) corporation with an abundance of land, and in some 
way responsible for what had happened by failing to remove the Grahams. Also, 
development land was at stake rather than a private residence.41 However, when 
the background to the case is considered in a little more depth, the culpability 
of the company does not appear so clear cut. Tere was a history of grazing 
agreements between the company and the Grahams, and it would clearly have 
been in the fnancial interests of the company to enter into another grazing 
agreement with the Grahams. Te reasons for not doing so were strategic: Tey 
feared it would prejudice a planning application. Te company was aware that 
the Grahams wished to use the land, and the company representative who visited 
the land may well have noticed that they were continuing to do so. It is arguable 
that the company had monitored the land, and its representatives were aware 
and content that it was being exploited and maintained while they were seeking 
planning permission. Te company’s representatives were simply guilty of not 
acting in an antagonistic or litigious fashion towards a neighbouring farmer. 
39. See JA Pye (Oxford) Holdings Ltd v Graham, [2000] Ch 676 at 709-10, Neuberger 
J [JA Pye 2000]. 
40. JA Pye 2008, supra note 23. References to the culpability of the company appear in the 
Chamber judgment at 68, the opinion of the dissenting judges at 1-12 and the Grand 
Chamber judgment at 80. 
41. See Heather Conway and John Stannard, “Te emotional paradoxes of adverse possession” 
(2013) 64 N Ir Leg Q 75 at 82-84. 
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B. WHAT ARE THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE “TYPICAL” OWNER 
AFFECTED BY THE IRISH LAW? 
Although adverse possession can occur in a myriad of diferent circumstances 
against owners of varying levels of culpability, it makes sense to take due 
consideration of the most common situations in assessing whether owners are 
blameworthy, and the case for additional protection. Is the argument made by 
Fox and Cobb relevant in the Irish context? Does the doctrine currently operate 
to punish “large landowners” who fail to comply with their duty of stewardship? 
Is it possible to make any generalizations about the position of the owner who 
loses title by adverse possession in response to Wylie’s reticence to introduce any 
reforms to the Irish law in this area prompted by ethical concerns? 
In Ireland, over one thousand adverse possession applications are made 
(pursuant to section 49 of the Registration of Title Act) to the Property Registration 
Authority in relation to registered land on an annual basis.42 Te majority of 
these “section 49 applications” are successful.43 In addition, approximately 
fve hundred applications for frst registration of unregistered land based on 
possession, otherwise known as Form 5 applications,44 are made on an annual 
basis.45 It has been informally confrmed that adverse possession applications 
to the Property Registration Authority are rarely lodged against the State, local 
authorities, or companies. Applications which are made against local authorities 
or companies are generally uncontested and involve small plots of land.46 For 
example, sometimes a small plot of land forming part of a housing estate is not 
disposed of and is instead incorporated into an adjacent garden. 
In 2008, the Property Registration Authority conducted an analysis of 
section 49 applications received during a one-month period in respect of two 
42. Tese applications are made by completing Form 6. See Land Registration Rules 2012 (IR), 
SI No 483/2012. Tis level of applications appears to be quite consistent: 1,378 section 49 
applications were received in 2007 and 1,081 applications were received in 2011. 
43. Eight hundred and eighty-four applications were completed in 2007. Seven hundred and 
seventy-eight applications were completed in 2011. Te rest were abandoned, withdrawn, 
refused, or transferred. 
44. Form 5 is set out in the Land Registration Rules 2012 (IR), SI No 483/2012. 
45. Eight hundred and seventy-three applications were received in 2007; 767 applications were 
received in 2012; 386 applications were received in 2013. 
46. It may be that when such cases arise, many of them are settled before an application is 
even made to the Property Registration Authority. For example, Kitty Holland discusses 
the fnancial settlements negotiated between Fingal County Council and certain traveller 
families living in Dunsink Lane. See Kitty Holland, “Whose Land Is It Anyway?,” Irish Times
(16 June 2007), online: <www.irishtimes.com/news/whose-land-is-it-anyway-1.1210808> 
[https://perma.cc/H37L-HCDW]. 
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counties, Cork and Waterford.47 Te analysis revealed that over 56 per cent of 
these applications involved adverse possession between family members, typically 
in relation to property forming part of an unadministered estate. It was confrmed 
that objections are made in the majority of section 49 applications, and that 70 
per cent of the objections reviewed in this survey were based on an entitlement 
to the land under the unadministered intestate or testate estate of the registered 
owner. Of course, once the limitation period has expired, such an objection 
has no legal basis and will not prevent registration in the absence of another 
valid ground for objection. For example, proof that the objector continued to 
engage in acts of possession, or that the applicant was not in possession or was in 
possession pursuant to a licence would all constitute valid grounds for objection. 
Where only one or some of the members of a family with entitlements under 
an unadministered estate enter into, or remain in possession, of the property 
following the death of the deceased owner, those out of possession are clearly in 
a very precarious position as the Irish law currently stands.48 It is easy to imagine 
a situation where absent members of the family were content to allow a sibling 
to continue to occupy a property but failed to appreciate that their interests 
were in danger of being extinguished by neglecting to formalize the arrangement. 
Te fact that family members frequently object to section 49 applications 
refects the counter-intuitive nature of the law on this issue. Te potential 
for misunderstanding renders absent family members extremely vulnerable, 
an argument that has been made to justify the English position, which precludes 
adverse possession in such circumstances.49 
Te internal survey conducted by the Property Registration Authority 
revealed that the second most common situation, representing 25 per cent of 
section 49 applications, involved lost or informal transfers. Twelve per cent of 
applications involved strangers to title, frequently in relation to abandoned land. 
Finally, 6 per cent of applications involved boundary issues.50 I have relied on 
this secondary data (i.e., the Property Registration Authority’s internal survey) to 
47. Note that this survey was restricted to registered land and did not include applications 
for frst registration based on possession. I am grateful to the Property Registration 
Authority for sharing this information with me, particularly CEO, Liz Pope, who patiently 
discussed it with me. 
48. For a discussion of the law in this area, see Una Woods, “Adverse Possession and 
Unadministered Estates: An Unfair Solution to a Redundant Irish Problem” (2016) 67 N Ir 
Leg Q 137 [Woods 2016]. 
49. Gareth Miller, “Te Administration of Estates and Adverse Possession” (2000) 150 New LJ 
940 at 940, 946. 
50. Note that 1% of applications involved a claim to commonage. 
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conduct my analysis of adverse possession applications for pragmatic reasons.51 
Although the organization’s aim coincided with my own—identifying how the 
doctrine is relied on in practice—as the Authority was the primary data collector, 
it decided on the survey’s scope and other aspects of how the survey was to be 
conducted. While the sample of section 49 applications surveyed was small (one 
month’s applications in 2008 in respect of two counties, totalling eighty-eight 
cases), I was reassured that the results accurately refected the experience of 
Examiners of Title who dealt with such applications on a daily basis. Te decision 
to sample the counties of Cork and Waterford was justifed on the basis that they 
contain a good mix of both urban and rural properties. 
Although only a minority of adverse possession disputes reach the courts, 
an analysis of the reported Irish case law reveals that most of these disputes 
arise between family members or neighbouring landowners.52 Te number of 
cases involving family members is unsurprising and refects the experience of 
the Property Registration Authority in dealing with section 49 applications. Te 
disputes between neighbours typically arise because one party encroaches on land 
that is not being used by the owner. It seems fair to assume that the fact that these 
cases reach court indicates the contentious nature of the dispute, the entrenched 
position of the parties, and consequently, the discordant relationship that can 
be predicted for these neighbours into the future regardless of the outcome.53 
Terefore, in Ireland, owners rarely lose title through adverse possession to a 
stranger unless the land has been abandoned. Most owners lose title to members 
of their family and, when the dispute is litigated, a signifcant number of cases 
involve neighbours. 
51. For further discussion of this methodology, see Una Woods, “Te Case for a Qualifed Veto 
System of Adverse Possession in Ireland: A Doctrinal Approach with ‘Bells and Whistles’” 
in Laura Cahilane & Jennifer Schweppe, eds, Case Studies in Legal Research Methodologies: 
Refections on Teory and Practice (Clarus Press, 2019). 
52. Tere are thirty-four cases listed in the Appendix. In sixteen of these cases there was a family 
relationship between the parties; fourteen cases involved neighbouring landowners; three 
cases involved a pre-existing contractual relationship between the parties; only one case 
involved strangers. 
53. As Jefrey Evans Stake points out, the doctrine “strains neighbourhood relations and could 
force us away from the most efcient use of the land.” See Jefrey Evans Stake, “Te Uneasy 
Case for Adverse Possession” (2001) 89 Geo LJ 2419 at 2433. William G Ackerman & 
Shane T Johnson list the “Creation of Division and Animosity Between Neighbours” 
as a disadvantage or problem of adverse possession. See William G Ackerman & Shane 
T Johnson, “Outlaws of the Past: A Western Perspective on Prescription and Adverse 
Possession” (1996) 31 Land & Water L Rev 79 at 94. 
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Although it is impossible to speculate on the circumstances that give rise 
to every claim, it seems reasonable to assume in this peculiarly familial or 
neighbourly context, that many such owners fail to take action out of a desire 
to avoid confict or because they imagine and trust that the occupier recognizes 
that their presence is simply tolerated. Although such owners may be accused 
of naivety or, in some cases, perhaps a degree of laxity in failing to familiarize 
themselves with the law, it seems harsh to denigrate them as “blameworthy” for 
failing to formalize the arrangement or commence litigation. It is submitted that 
these owners are particularly vulnerable and would beneft from a system that 
would warn them if they are in danger of losing title through adverse possession.54 
II. THE PROTECTION AFFORDED TO OWNERS BY THE 
INCONSISTENT USE TEST 
Te inconsistent use test features most prominently in Ontario case law; therefore, 
its status in that particular jurisdiction is the focus of this article. Te test was 
incorporated into the law on adverse possession in Ontario by a trilogy of Court 
of Appeal decisions delivered in the 1970s and 1980s: Keefer v Arillotta,55 Fletcher 
v Storoschuk,56 and Masidon Investments Ltd v Ham.57 As was the case with the 
rule in Leigh v Jack, it is not immediately obvious where the inconsistent use test 
fts in the proofs that make up an adverse possession claim, as identifed in Pfug 
and Pfug v Collins:58 actual possession for the statutory period, possession with 
the intention of excluding the owner, and the efective exclusion of the owner’s 
possession for the statutory period.59 In Keefer and Fletcher, Justice Wilson clearly 
regarded the test as relevant to the establishment of animus possidendi; that is, 
it was part of the second requirement set out in Pfug. She stated that the person 
claiming a possessory title must have an intention to exclude the owner from 
54. In the case of applications in relation to land, which had been the subject of a lost or 
informal transfer or abandoned, it is clear that such owners have no need of additional 
protection. It is submitted that any reforms made to the law on adverse possession should not 
impede such applicants. 
55. (1976), 72 DLR (3d) 182 (Ont CA) [Keefer]. 
56. (1981), 128 DLR (3d) 59 (Ont CA) [Fletcher]. 
57. (1984), 45 OR (2d) 563 (CA) [Masidon]. 
58. [1952] 3 DLR 681 (Ont HC) [Pfug]. 
59. See ibid at 689. Tis three-part test has been cited with approval in many subsequent 
decisions. See e.g. Keefer, supra note 55; Teis, supra note 2. In Pfug, the third requirement 
was referred to as the “discontinuance of possession” by the owner and all others, if any, 
entitled to possession. However, subsequent case law has clarifed that efective exclusion 
must be proved. 
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such uses as the owner wants to make of their property. However, in Masidon, 
Justice Blair regarded the inconsistent use test as relevant in establishing whether 
the third requirement for adverse possession had been satisfed, i.e., whether the 
owner had been efectively excluded from the land. As Michael Lubetsky points 
out, to confuse matters further, a third line of authority treats the inconsistent use 
test as part of both the animus and exclusion requirements.60 
Brian Bucknall, in an article published just after the Court of Appeal for 
Ontario decision was delivered in Masidon, was critical of the adoption of the 
inconsistent use test which demands an inquiry into both the intention of the 
owner and the intention of the possessor.61 He felt that when Justice Wilson’s 
inconsistent use test gloss is put on the test for animus possidendi, it requires the 
person in possession of the land to: (1) know that they do not own the land, (2) 
know who does own the land, and (3) know the intentions that the owner has 
with regard to the use of the lands.62 As Bucknall notes, proof of any intention is 
difcult and proving this degree of knowledge and intent over a ten-year period 
will obviously represent a considerable challenge. He noted that the formulation 
is almost impossible to apply in the most common adverse possession scenario, 
where both the owner and the possessor are mistaken about the nature and extent 
of their respective rights in relation to a boundary strip and, therefore, cannot 
establish an intention consistent with Justice Wilson’s legal test. 
It is interesting to note that in Beaudoin v Aubin,63 an Ontario case that 
involved a mutual mistake in relation to the ownership of a boundary strip, Justice 
Anderson, in a decision delivered after Keefer and Fletcher but before Masidon, 
made no attempt to apply the inconsistent use test. He rejected the notion that 
sections 4 and 15 of the Limitations Act 1970 required a claimant to demonstrate 
a subjective intention, with knowledge of the rights of the plaintif present in 
his mind, to occupy in defance or denial of those rights. He distinguished 
several cases where intention was found to be an important element by showing 
that they focused on factual situations in which the acts of possession were 
equivocal.64 After conducting a historical review of the law on adverse possession, 
Justice Anderson concluded that since the abolition of “adverse possession” in its 
60. See Laurier Homes (27) Ltd v Brett (2005), 42 RPR (4th) 86 (Ont Sup Ct). See also 
Lubetsky, supra note 5 at 513-14. 
61. See Bucknall, supra note 2. 
62. Ibid at 380. 
63. (1981), 125 DLR (3d) 277 (Ont HC) [Beaudoin]. 
64. See Re St Clair Beach Estates Ltd v MacDonald et al (1974), 5 OR (2d) 482 (Div Ct); 
Sherren v Pearson (1886), 14 SCR 581; Williams Bros Direct Supply Stores Ltd v Raferty, 
[1957] 3 All ER 593. 
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technical sense,65 where the acts of possession are certain and unequivocal, animus 
possidendi can be presumed. 
Since the Court of Appeal for Ontario trilogy, the inconsistent use test has 
not been applied in a consistent fashion by Ontario courts. Lubetsky succinctly 
explains why:66 Te test produces counterintuitive and even outrageous results 
when applied in certain situations. As Lubetsky notes, in some cases delivered 
after the trilogy,67 the courts simply followed Beaudoin and made no attempt 
to reconcile it with the case law that applies the test.68 However, in other cases 
the judicial response was to imply an intention on the part of the owner or to 
graft exceptions to the test. According to Lubetsky, the “fantastic diversity of 
approaches read as a whole, represent a highly creative brainstorming exercise 
among the judiciary,”69 but the diferent approaches have also made the law in 
this area increasingly unclear. His detailed overview of the case law reveals that 
the test tends not to be applied in cases of mutual or unilateral mistake in relation 
to the ownership of the land.70 On occasion, the test also tends not to be applied 
where the owner has clearly lost interest in the land and sufcient evidence of 
their intentions cannot be submitted to the court.71 Tis is dubbed the “apathetic 
titleholder” by Lubetsky.72 
It is submitted that the difculties encountered in cases of mutual or 
unilateral mistake or apathetic owners are undoubtedly a result of the treatment 
of the inconsistent use test as a standard element of the adverse possession proofs 
and not a special rule to govern a situation where the owner has future plans for 
the property. If an owner has no plans for the property and is not engaged in any 
activities as the user, because of a mistake in relation to its ownership or due to 
65. Under the old law some acts of possession were deemed to be acts on behalf of the owner. 
Tis approach was abolished by the enactment of An Act to Amend the Law Respecting Real 
Property, and to Render the Proceedings for recovering possession thereof in certain cases, less 
difcult and expensive, which adopted the language of the Real Property Limitations Act. See 
An Act to Amend the Law Respecting Real Property, and to Render the Proceedings for Recovering 
Possession thereof in Certain Cases, Less Difcult and Expensive (UK), 1834, 4 Will IV, c 1; Real 
Property Limitations Act, 1833 (UK), 3 & 4 Will IV, c 27. 
66. Lubetsky, supra note 5. 
67. See e.g. Keil v 762098 Ontario (1992), 91 DLR (4th) 752 (Ont CA). 
68. Lubetsky, supra, note 5 at 516. 
69. Ibid at 537. 
70. See Teis, supra note 2. Mutual mistake between the parties relates to who owns the land. See 
also Bradford, supra note 2. Unilateral mistake on the part of the squatter or a good faith 
belief in ownership is discussed in Bradford. 
71. See Galati v Tassone, [1986] OJ No 698 (HC) [Galati]. 
72. Lubetsky, supra note 5 at 520-21. 
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apathy, then they should be treated as having discontinued possession.73 which 
renders it unnecessary to prove that they have been dispossessed or excluded 
from possession. In such circumstances, the inconsistent use test is inapplicable, 
and the claimant should succeed once they prove possession and animus 
possidendi. However, as the remainder of this article demonstrates, there are other 
fundamental objections to the test that cannot be overcome by simply confning 
its application to a situation where the owner has future plans for the property. 
A. JUDICIAL DISSATISFACTION WITH THE INCONSISTENT USE TEST 
A striking feature of the case law that refers to the inconsistent use test is the hint 
of judicial dissatisfaction with the test that threads its way through the judgments, 
sometimes subtle but on other occasions more forceful. In Teis, Justice Laskin 
commented as follows:74 
Te test of inconsistent use focuses on the intention of the owner or paper title 
holder, not on the intention of the claimant. It is a controversial element of an 
adverse possession claim even when the claimant knowingly trespasses on the 
owner’s land. … Taken at face value its application could unduly limit successful 
adverse possession claims, especially when land is left vacant. [Te] paper title holder 
could always claim an intention to develop or sell the land, or could maintain that 
a person in possession cannot hold adversely to someone who does not care what is 
happening on the land. 
In Bradford Investments Ltd v Fama,75 Justice Cullity was more vociferous in 
his condemnation of the rule. He noted that the rule in Leigh v Jack has been 
completely discredited in England. However, despite the persuasive force of the 
reasoning in Pye, he felt he was not entitled to follow recent English decisions 
as he was bound by the trilogy of Court of Appeal for Ontario decisions. 
He commented as follows: 
73. Statutes of limitation typically state that a right of action to recover land is deemed to have 
accrued once the person bringing the action has been dispossessed or discontinued his 
possession. Te classic explanation of the distinction between the two terms was put forward 
by Lord Justice Fry who stated that dispossession involves some form of ouster of the paper 
owner by the squatter while in instances of discontinuance the owner is found to have given 
up possession before the squatter enters on the land. See Rains v Buxton (1879), 14 Ch D 
537 at 539. As was explained by Chief Justice Blackburne the term “discontinuance” is 
used to mean an abandonment of possession. See McDonnell v McKinty (1847), 10 ILR 
514 at 526 (Ir). 
74. Teis, supra note 2 at para 24. 
75. Bradford, supra note 2. 
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Te introduction and development of the requirement of inconsistent use, and its 
application in this jurisdiction has led the courts to draw a distinction between 
knowing trespassers and other trespassers. To relate this to the terms of section 4 [of 
the Real Property Limitations Act 1990] requires some intellectual efort. It means not 
only that the time that a true owner’s right of re-entry will accrue will depend on the 
result of an enquiry into the purposes for which the property was held at diferent 
times within the statutory period, but also on the state of a claimant’s knowledge. 
If the policy behind the statue is to provide certainty of land titles by protecting 
the settled expectations of those who have enjoyed undisturbed possession of land 
for what is considered to be a reasonable period, and to avoid litigation over titles 
that will require an inquiry into events—let alone subjective states of mind—in the 
distant past, the development could be considered regressive.76 
Lubetsky is of the view that the inconsistent use test has reached a point of crisis. 
He speculates that the Court of Appeal for Ontario may well review it when an 
appropriate case comes before it.77 It is interesting to note that Supreme Court 
of Canada recently obliquely referred to the possibility of such a review in Nelson 
(City) v Mowatt:78 
[T]he question properly before this Court is not whether the inconsistent use 
requirement is necessary or desirable; we have received no submissions, for example, 
on whether it should continue to apply to claims based on adverse possession in 
Ontario. 
Terefore, it is important to clarify whether the inconsistent use test should be 
part of the law on adverse possession. Te remainder of Part II of this article 
attempts to identify an underlying rationale for the inconsistent use test, and to 
critically assess its shortcomings and the case for its retention. 
B. A “RAISON D’ÊTRE” FOR THE TEST 
Lubetsky points out that the rise and fall of the inconsistent use test in the course 
of a single generation “begs the question of how it managed to catch on in the frst 
place.”79 He speculates that Ontario’s adverse possession law was apparently missing 
something important that this test seemed to address. He makes an interesting 
argument that the “something” was the civil law principle of interversion and 
the inconsistent use test acts as a functional equivalent to this civil law concept. 
Interversion deals with the dilemma of a detainer, that is someone who uses 
the land “with acknowledgement of a superior domain,” who changes intention 
76. Ibid at para 100. 
77. Lubetsky, supra note 5 at 525. 
78. Nelson (City) v Mowatt, 2017 SCC 8 at para 21. 
79. Lubetsky, supra note 5 at 525. 
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vis-à-vis the property under detention and develops animus domini (an intention 
to be the owner), a crucial component of acquisitive prescription. As the owner 
has no way of knowing that the detainer has formed the requisite animus to start 
the clock running on acquisitive prescription, the civil law requires the detainer 
to manifest any change of intention with unequivocal facts and thereby give 
notice to the true owner that their legal relationship has changed. 
Lubetsky’s empirical analysis of the case law of Ontario leads him to the 
conclusion that the inconsistent use test was typically applied in interversion-type 
situations, and only those adverse possessors who demonstrated interversion 
through unequivocal facts succeeded when the inconsistent use test was applied. 
According to Lubetsky, most people who use the land “with acknowledgment of 
a superior domain” can be characterized as a grantee (of an easement), a tenant/ 
licensee, or a co-owner.80 Tus, according to his theory, the inconsistent use 
test will only be critical in resolving cases where the adverse possessor took 
possession in such circumstances. One difculty with Lubetsky’s analysis is that 
in a number of cases where he classifes the possessor as having taken possession 
“with acknowledgment of a superior domain,”81 he fnds no evidence of any of 
the scenarios he mentions. 
Te adverse possessor may have been aware that they were not the owners of 
the disputed plot but there was no evidence that they had commenced the use 
of the land by virtue of a grant, lease, or a licence. Further difculties present 
themselves, even if one considers his classifcation unimpeachable in this respect. 
Lubetsky’s central argument seems to be that the common law has not specifcally 
catered for the complications that such situations give rise to. It is submitted that 
this is not the case. Regardless of whether or not one applies the inconsistent use 
test, a possessor who originally commenced the use of the land by virtue of a right 
of way, a lease, or a licence has always faced more difculties in proving adverse 
possession. Where the claimant already had a right of way over the disputed land, 
unless the acts of possession are unequivocal, they will have to prove an intention 
to exclude the true owner which may be problematic in these circumstances.82 
Where the claimant took possession pursuant to a lease or a licence, time will 
only run against the owner when the permission or lease has expired.83 Tis 
80. Ibid at 527. 
81. See e.g. Fletcher, supra note 56; Elliot v Woodstock Agricultural Society, [2007] OJ No 3064 
(Sup Ct); Marotta v Creative Investments Ltd, [2008] OJ No 1399 (Sup Ct). 
82. See e.g. Littledale v Liverpool College, [1900] 1 Ch 19 (CA); George Wimpey & Co Ltd v Sohn, 
[1967] Ch 487 (CA). 
83. See Bellew v Bellew, [1982] IR 447 (Ir). 
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moment may be difcult to pinpoint and the legislature has, on occasion, found 
it necessary to clarify when a right of action is deemed to accrue.84 
In England, adverse possession by a co-owner against his fellow co-owners is 
prohibited by legislation.85 In the United States, the co-owner out of possession 
must have notice of a repudiation of the co-ownership agreement before time can 
run in favour of the co-owner in possession.86 Te common law is not missing a 
concept to deal with these scenarios. Te judiciary and the legislature have taken 
pains to deal with the complications which they present. I would argue that the 
emergence of the inconsistent use test and its exceptions may be explained in a 
less complicated manner by looking at what the judiciary have said. 
As this test makes it more difcult for a claimant to succeed, in formulating 
the exceptions to the rule and implying fctitious intentions, the judiciary has, 
on occasion, been forced into a discussion of who should beneft from the 
law on adverse possession and in what circumstances. Tis unusual feature of 
Ontario case law contrasts sharply with the case law in England and Ireland 
which, for the most part, demonstrates a concerted efort on the part of the 
judiciary to apply the law in an objective fashion regardless of the merits or 
demerits of the possessor or the owner. Te application of the inconsistent use 
test is clearly motivated by a judicial desire to make it more difcult for deliberate 
(bad faith) squatters to succeed against a responsible owner. Terefore, as one 
would expect, it has evolved in a manner that denies its additional protection 
to certain owners: for example, those who have mistaken the position of their 
boundary,87 or acquiesced in an enclosure by a neighbour who believed they were 
the owner.88 Also, in some cases, the courts have refused to apply the test where 
the owner has efectively abandoned the land.89 While a plausible rationale exists 
for the inconsistent use test, the judicial gymnastics apparent from Lubetsky’s 
overview of the case law associated with it, reveal signifcant pitfalls with its 
84. Te Statute of Limitations Act, 1957 provides that, in the case of a periodic tenancy with no 
written lease, the tenancy is determined on the expiration of the frst period when no rent 
is paid. Additionally, the right of action accrues at that point. See Statute of Limitations Act, 
1957 (NI), s 17(2). 
85. Limitation Act 1980 (UK), schedule 1, para 9. In Ireland, it is easier for a co-owner to 
acquire title by adverse possession against another co-owner, but this position may have been 
necessary historically to allow the ownership of farms to be updated following a death on 
title. For discussion, see text accompanying footnote 134 below. 
86. See Louis S Muldrow, “Te Adverseness of Possession to Fractional Interests” (1957) 9 
Baylor L Rev 168. 
87. See Beaudoin, supra note 63; Teis, supra note 2. 
88. See Bradford, supra note 2. 
89. See Galati, supra note 71. 
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application. As mentioned earlier, certain difculties could be resolved by simply 
confning the test’s application to a situation where the owner has future plans 
for the property. It is worth considering, therefore, the case for embracing such 
a re-engineered test. 
C. THE CASE BY KATZ FOR AN INCONSISTENT USE MODEL OF ADVERSE 
POSSESSION 
In a 2010 article,90 Katz claims that the inconsistent use test has been wrongly 
maligned. She argues that the inconsistent use model of adverse possession 
recognizes the authority of the owner to set an agenda for the land and to 
remain the owner without maintaining possession, but allows for a vacancy in 
ownership to be flled where the owner is no longer exercising their authority and 
the land has become agenda-less. Katz draws an analogy between the position 
of the successful adverse possessor and a government that has taken over as 
a result of a bloodless coup d’état. Katz maintains that this model of adverse 
possession solves the problems of agenda-less objects just as the recognition of the 
existing government (whatever its origins) solves the problem of stateless people. 
Katz also maintains that this model of adverse possession permits the radical 
transformation of squatters into owners without collapsing into a moral paradox 
where the law appears to reward the theft of land.91 She notes that American 
commentators have become increasingly dubious of the role played by adverse 
possession in resolving certain utilitarian issues and concerned with the morality 
of the transformation of the deliberate squatter into a land owner. Consequently, 
she claims that judicial practices have been limiting the extent to which bad faith 
squatters can succeed under the doctrine. She states that English commentators 
have managed to sidestep the moral incoherence of the doctrine by relying on an 
overly procedural model of adverse possession. Tis approach relies heavily on the 
doctrine of relativity of title that recognizes the right to possess for both the owner 
and the possessor and emphasizes that once the owner’s title is extinguished, the 
squatter’s right to possession becomes unassailable. Katz criticizes this approach 
as relying on an unsatisfactorily weak conception of ownership.92Although Katz 
assumes ambivalence on the part of English jurists in relation to the morality of 
the doctrine, certain judges have been quite vociferous in their criticism of the 
90. See Katz, supra note 9. 
91. Ibid at 60-63. 
92. Ibid at 52-60. 
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law that preceded the 2002 reforms.93 It is also important to note that a very clear 
moral stance was adopted by the Law Commission of England and Wales in the 
proposals that formed the basis for these changes.94 As mentioned, Fox and Cobb 
accused the Commission of “moral essentialism” in its views that the owner who 
lost title was blameless and that urban squatters were undeserving of the benefts 
conferred by the old regime.95 
Katz’s preferred model of adverse possession is as attractive as she presents 
it. However, as she herself acknowledges, the inconsistent use model of adverse 
possession has not been perfectly articulated in any jurisdiction.96 Te judicial 
quagmire of approaches that the test generated in Ontario is illustrative of the 
practical difculties that it presents. Legislative or judicial clarifcation that the 
test shall only apply where the owner has a future agenda for the property would 
not eliminate these difculties, as the presence or absence of such an agenda may 
not be easy to establish in practice. As has been pointed out by the judiciary, 
an owner could always claim an intention to develop or sell the property in the 
future.97 Trying to establish subjective intention is always difcult and the test 
does not tell us how specifc the owner’s purpose or future plans have to be. For 
example, it is unclear how the test should be applied if the owner had a number 
of alternative purposes or plans for the land and the squatter’s current use was 
compatible with one or some of them but not with others. Also, the test would 
not protect the owner who has yet to decide on what they will do with the land 
or where the original plans of the owner or their predecessor in title have been 
forgotten or are unclear.98 
Also, assessing the inconsistency of the squatter’s acts of possession may not 
be as straightforward as Katz suggests. For example, she states that an owner 
with development plans requires the land to remain vacant until they are ready 
to develop and, therefore, an adverse possessor who occupies the land interferes 
with such plans.99 In reality, developer-owners do not require the land to remain 
vacant in the interim and Katz does not give a true sense of the difculties 
93. JA Pye 2000, supra note 39 at 709-10, Neuberger J; JA Pye 2002, supra note 2 at paras 2, 73, 
Lord Bingham and Lord Hope, respectively. 
94. Law Com No 254, supra note 19 at para 10.19. 
95. Cobb & Fox, supra note 30. 
96. Katz, supra note 9 at 63. 
97. See Teis, supra note 2 at para 24. 
98. See Tracey Enterprises MacAdam Limited v Drury, [2006] IEHC 381 (Ir). Although evidence 
was given that the disputed plot may have been acquired with the intention of extending 
quarrying onto it, Justice Lafoy was not convinced of this. 
99. Katz, supra note 9 at 69. 
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facing an adverse possessor who occupies the land in such circumstances. Te 
judiciary has noted it may be impossible for an adverse possessor to succeed 
against such an owner.100 At the very least, the case law indicates that the erection 
of some sort of permanent building would be required.101 Te speculator-owner 
with a plan to sell the land when the time was right (typically when it becomes 
rezoned for development purposes) is also in a strong position when the test is 
applied. Katz, however, seems to draw quite an arbitrary distinction between 
the speculator-owner and the owner who plans to develop the land themselves. 
She states that the speculator-owner should be treated as having discontinued 
possession by failing to exercise agenda-setting authority. A failure to set an agenda 
for the land renders the inconsistent user test inapplicable.102 She seems to equate 
a plan to sell the land with an intention to abandon it which is surely an extremely 
harsh view to take of property speculation and again fails to refect the case law 
where such owners benefted from the application of the inconsistent use test.103 
According to Katz, the owner who does not realize they are the owner should 
also be taken to have discontinued possession which means that the inconsistent 
use test does not apply in cases of mutual mistake or unilateral mistake on the 
part of the owner.104 However, she maintains that the test should still apply in 
cases of unilateral mistake on the part of the squatter where the true owner is 
aware of their rights and has an agenda for the property. She maintains that such 
a squatter will fnd it next to impossible to satisfy the test, presumably because 
only “knowing” squatters will be in a position to engage in acts which directly 
challenge the authority of the owner. Katz states that this situation is problematic 
only if we think that there ought to be some connection between the virtue of 
the squatter and the reward of adverse possession. Instead, she maintains that it 
is not on the merits of the use or the user that adverse possession is justifed, but 
rather on the imperative in any property system to guard against vacancies in 
the position of the owner.105 Although Katz does not comment on the situation, 
presumably an owner who has acquiesced in a mistaken enclosure by the squatter 
100. See Masidon, supra note 57 at 573-74. 
101. See Skidmore v Parkin (2002), 5 RPR (4th) 53 at para 33 (Ont Sup Ct). 
102. Katz, supra note 9 at 69-70. 
103. See Masidon, supra note 57; see also Marotta v Creative Investments Ltd (2008), 69 RPR (4th) 
44 (Ont Sup Ct). 
104. Katz, supra note 9 at 70-71. 
105. Ibid at 71. As shall be demonstrated below, the introduction of a qualifed veto system of 
adverse possession achieves both objectives: restricting the operation of the doctrine to 
appropriate and deserving cases and restoring abandoned land to the market. 
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should be treated as having discontinued possession, rendering the inconsistent 
use test inapplicable. 
Katz makes a convincing case that the law on adverse possession should 
respect the authority of the owner to set an agenda for the property and remain 
the owner while not in possession. However, if more protection is needed for 
the owner, it is clear that the application of the inconsistent use test or the rule 
in Leigh v Jack is an inelegant and haphazard method of meeting such a need, 
which creates unnecessary complications in the law on adverse possession. 
A fundamental problem with Katz’s argument for the adoption of an inconsistent 
use model of adverse possession is her implicit assumption that it is the best 
model for protecting the authority of the owner. 
Lubetsky’s article highlights that owners may sometimes need a clear warning 
that possession is adverse,106 while Katz points to a desire to protect absent owners 
from inadvertently losing title without acts that demonstrate a direct challenge 
to their authority or agenda. Both seem to be concerned that an owner may not 
realize what is happening on the ground. It is worth exploring the merits of the 
qualifed veto system of adverse possession, recently introduced in England and 
Wales, as a pragmatic alternative to the inconsistent use test. Te remainder of 
this article explores the case for the introduction of such a system in Ireland, 
a jurisdiction that has yet (as is the case in Ontario with the inconsistent use test) 
to defnitively reject the rule in Leigh v Jack. 
III. THE QUALIFIED VETO SYSTEM OF ADVERSE 
POSSESSION 
A. THE ENGLISH EXPERIENCE 
Before the Land Registration Act 2002, the same rules governed adverse possession 
of unregistered land and land that had been registered in the Land Registry in 
England and Wales.107 Any person claiming to have acquired title to a registered 
estate by adverse possession could apply to be registered as proprietor of that 
estate and the registrar, on being satisfed that adverse possession had been 
106. Lubetsky, supra note 5. 
107. Te Land Registration Act 1925 provided that the Limitation Acts shall apply to registered 
land in the same manner and to the same extent as those Acts applied to unregistered land. 
See Land Registration Act 1925 (UK), 15 & 16 Geo V, c 12, s 75(1). 
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established, would register the applicant as the new owner.108 Te qualifed veto 
system of adverse possession introduced by the 2002 Act only applies to land that 
has been registered in the Land Registry.109 
Under the 2002 Act, an adverse possessor who has been in adverse possession 
of a registered estate in land for at least ten years110 is entitled to apply to be 
registered as proprietor of that estate.111 Te Land Registry must serve the 
registered proprietor of the estate, any charge and any superior registered estate 
(if the estate is leasehold) with notice of the application112 and any person who 
receives such a notice is entitled to veto the application.113 However, the adverse 
possessor will be entitled to be registered as proprietor of the estate if there is no 
response to the notices served,114 or if no action is taken to repossess the land 
within two years of the rejection of the adverse possessor’s application.115 
Terefore, the doctrine will continue to play an important role in restoring 
abandoned land to the market. Also, in three exceptional situations where the 
Commission felt that the balance of fairness lay with the adverse possessor,116 
the applicant will be registered in spite of an objection by a notice recipient. 
108. Ibid, s 75(2)-(3). Rights acquired or in the process of being acquired through adverse 
possession amounted to “overriding interests” which would bind a proprietor on frst 
registration or following a disposition of registered land even though they did not appear 
on the register. See Land Registration Act 1925 (UK), 15 & 16 Geo V, c 12, s 70(1)(f ). 
Subsequent legislation reduces slightly the overriding status of the rights of an adverse 
possessor so that they will only bind a new owner if the adverse possessor was in actual 
occupation and his or her occupation was apparent or known to the new owner. See Land 
Registration Act 2002, supra note 18, s 11(4)(b)-(c); Land Registration Act 2002, supra note 
18, schedule 3, para 2(c). 
109. Te Act introduces a divergence between the law governing adverse possession of registered 
and unregistered land which is discussed below. Te Law Commission argued that extending 
the veto system to unregistered land could weaken the security of title to such land as 
the doctrine of adverse possession plays an essential role in the investigation of such titles 
by curing title defects and facilitating transactions in relation to such land. See UK, Law 
Commission, Land Registration for the Twenty-First Century: A Conveyancing Revolution (Law 
Com No 271) (Te Stationery Ofce, 2001) at para 14.2 [Law Com No 271]. 
110. Note that the limitation period for actions to recover unregistered land continues to be 
twelve years. See Limitation Act 1980, s 15(1). 
111. Land Registration Act 2002, supra note 18, schedule 6, para 1. 
112. Ibid at para 2. 
113. Ibid at para 3, 5. Te veto is exercisable by requiring that the application be dealt with under 
para 5, which only allows the applicant to be registered if one of the three conditions set out 
therein is met. 
114. Ibid at para 4. 
115. Ibid at paras 6-7. 
116. Law Com No 271, supra note 109 at para 14.36. 
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Te frst exception preserves the doctrine’s operation where the applicant can 
prove an equity by estoppel and the circumstances are such that they ought to 
be registered as the owner.117 In its discussion of this exception in the report that 
preceded the enactment of the 2002 Act, the Law Commission gave an example 
of a purchaser who went into possession of land pursuant to an oral contract for 
sale that was unenforceable as it was not “in writing” as required by section 2 of 
the Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1989.118 Te second exception 
permits reliance on the doctrine where the applicant is “for some other reason” 
entitled to be registered as the owner of the estate119 (e.g., if the adverse possessor 
had contracted to buy the land and paid the purchase price but the legal estate 
was never transferred to them).120 Te third exception facilitates the registration 
of an applicant who owns adjacent land and who reasonably believed for at least 
ten years ending on the date of the application that the land, which is the subject 
matter of the application, belonged to them.121 
B. LESSONS FOR IRELAND 
Te reforms to the doctrine introduced in England and Wales by the 2002 
Act “received widespread (if not universal) support.”122 While property lawyers 
have traditionally emphasized the justifcations for the doctrine, a radical 
transformation in attitude towards it justifability appears to have taken place 
in recent times.123 As mentioned, members of the judiciary have been critical of 
117. Land Registration Act 2002, supra note 18, schedule 6, para 5(2). 
118. See Law Com No 271, supra note 109 at para 14.42. 
119. Land Registration Act 2002, supra note 18, schedule 6, para 5(3). 
120. Te Law Commission provided these examples in its report. See Law Com No 271, supra
note 109 at para 14.43. For a discussion of the difculties that arise in treating informal 
purchasers as adverse possessors and how these problems could be resolved, see Una 
Woods, “Adverse Possession and Informal Purchasers” (2009) 60 N Ir Leg Q 305 [Woods, 
“Informal Purchasers”]. 
121. Land Registration Act 2002, supra note 18, schedule 6, para 5(4). For a critical discussion 
of this qualifcation to the veto system, see Una Woods, “Adverse Possession and Boundary 
Disputes, Lessons for Ireland from Abroad” (2016) 8 Intl JL Built Env 56. 
122. Roger J Smith, Property Law, 6th ed (Pearson, 2009) at 67. Te reforms to the English law 
on adverse possession introduced by the Land Registration Act 2002 have been described 
as efecting an “emasculation” of the doctrine insofar as it applies to registered land. See 
Martin Dixon, “Te Reform of Property Law and the Land Registration Act 2002: A Risk 
Assessment” [2003] Conveyancer & Property Law 136 at 150. Neil Cobb & Lorna Fox 
expressed reservations in relation to the reforms. See Cobb & Fox, supra note 30. 
123. See Cobb & Fox, supra note 30 at 237-38. Cobb point out that a slight majority (60 per 
cent) of those who responded to the Law Commission’s consultation supported the proposed 
reforms “in principle.” 
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the doctrine, especially in its application to registered land. For example, in Pye, 
Lord Bingham of Cornhill declared the outcome of the adverse possession claim 
as “apparently unjust.”124 Gray and Gray note:125 
Tis view mirrored a growing public perception that it had become “too easy for 
squatters to acquire title.” A criticism which attracted added force where difculties 
in the efective policing of vacant premises by cash-strapped local authorities could 
easily lead to substantial losses for the public purse … . If property is indeed a 
relationship of socially approved control over a valued resource, it had become quite 
clear that in the Britain of the 21st century, adverse possession of land is a form of 
control which is no longer socially approved. 
Tompson states that the reforms “will undoubtedly make the law substantively 
more satisfactory” and meet, to a considerable extent, the objections of those 
who viewed the traditional regime as distasteful.126 It is interesting to note that 
in a report published by the Law Commission of England and Wales on 24 
July 2018,127 the Commission noted that responses to their consultation on how 
the adverse possession scheme is operating under the Land Registration Act 2002
did not suggest that fundamental reform to the scheme was desirable. Instead, 
the Commission made some recommendations to deal with certain procedural 
or technical issues related to how the law operates.128 Recently, the decision in 
Best v Curtis129 illustrates an additional procedural issue which may require to 
be revisited. While certain commentary on this case focused on the fact that 
124. JA Pye 2002, supra note 2. 
125. Kevin Gray & Susan Francis Gray, Elements of Land Law, 5th ed (Oxford University Press, 
2009) at para 9.1.15. 
126. Mark P Tompson, “Adverse Possession: Te Abolition of Heresies” [2002] Conveyancer 
& Prop Law 480 at 492. Tompson strongly welcomes the reforms. See also Mark P 
Tompson, Modern Land Law, 5th ed (Oxford University Press, 2012) at 271. 
127. UK, Law Commission, Updating the Land Registration Act 2002 (Law Com No 380) (Te 
Stationery Ofce, 2018) at para 17.4. 
128. Ibid, ch 17. 
129. Best v Curtis (administrator of the estate of Curtis), [2016] EWLandRA 2015-0130. 
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the current law permitted a “criminal”130 to be registered pursuant to the 2002 
Act, the decision in the Property Chamber hinged on the fact that Mr. Curtis, 
as a personal representative, would only be entitled to object to the registration of 
Mr. Best as proprietor if he had previously applied to the registrar to be registered 
as a person entitled to be notifed of such applications. Robin Hickey notes that it 
is arguable that specifc provisions ought to be made for personal representatives 
to be notifed of adverse possession applications.131 It is submitted, however, that 
a number of more substantive lessons can be learned from the English experience 
by legislators in Ireland (or any jurisdiction, including Ontario, Canada) 
considering the introduction of a similar system of adverse possession. 
Te article written by Fox and Cobb highlights the value of empirical 
research as a precursor to any law reform project. It is important to consider 
how the law on adverse possession currently operates in practice: Who is afected 
and who benefts from the law on adverse possession? Te Northern Ireland 
Law Commission emphasized that it would be important to carry out “a much 
more detailed analysis of the diferent considerations applicable to the various 
scenarios involving adverse possession” before a qualifed veto system could even 
be considered for Northern Ireland.132 
Tis article demonstrates the prevalence of adverse possession between family 
members and neighbours in Ireland and discusses the reasons why owners may 
be vulnerable and in need of additional protection in such circumstances. Any 
empirical research should also engage with the possible impact of reform. Fox and 
130. In earlier judicial review proceedings, the Court of Appeal upheld an order that the Chief 
Land Registrar had to proceed with Mr. Best’s application to be registered on the basis of 
adverse possession, notwithstanding the fact that for at least part of the relevant period 
he had been committing the ofence of trespass in a residential building pursuant to the 
Legal Aid Sentencing and Punishment of Ofenders Act 2012. See Legal Aid Sentencing and 
Punishment of Ofenders Act 2012 (UK), s 144; R (on the application of Best) v Chief Land 
Registrar, [2015] EWCA Civ 17. Robin Hickey, “Te Best Outcome: Te Application of 
Schedule 6 and the Reinforcement of Adverse Possession policy under the Land Registration 
Act 2002: Best v Curtis” [2017] Conveyancer & Prop Law 53 at 60. Hickey comments: 
For now, it seems at least strange for the law on the one hand to recognise the potential for 
adverse possessors to become registered proprietors and on the other to posit a criminal ofence 
likely to catch anyone adversely possessing residential premises. … [W]e will need to address 
again the relationship between these provisions [of the Land Registration Act 2002] and the 
criminal ofence in LASPOA 2012, s 144.” 
See also Mark West, “Adverse Possession, Illegality and Land Registration: Te Balancing of 
Conficting Public Policies” [2015] Conveyancer & Prop Law 432. 
131. Hickey, supra note 130 at 59. 
132. Consultation Paper, supra note 27 at para 2.51. 
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Cobb argued that the English reforms would negatively impact the urban squatter 
making use of a forgotten property. I have argued elsewhere that urban squatting 
is not commonplace in Ireland;133 the predominant impact of the introduction 
of a qualifed veto system of adverse possession would be to preclude claims by 
“sibling” adverse possessors who went into possession of property forming part 
of an unadministered estate of a deceased parent. Te historical justifcation for 
the operation of the doctrine in favour of the child in possession in Ireland was 
to permit ownership of small farms to be updated at a time when will-making 
was uncommon, emigration was widespread, and grants of representation were 
rarely extracted when a farmer died intestate.134 As pointed out elsewhere, this 
peculiarly agricultural justifcation is no longer relevant in modern Ireland135 
and it must be questioned whether it is fair to allow the occupying sibling to 
extinguish the rights of those out of possession.136 Although it is difcult to make 
generalizations in this area, it could be argued that the moral entitlement of an 
applicant who has entered or remained in possession of the family home or a 
residential investment property following the death of a parent is not as strong as 
that of a child who had been raised to take over a farm, and perhaps forgone an 
education and adequate pay during the lifetime of the parent. 
As I have already mentioned, it is also easy to imagine a situation where absent 
members of the family were content to allow a sibling to continue to occupy 
a property but failed to appreciate that their interests were in danger of being 
extinguished by neglecting to formalize the arrangement. Adverse possession 
is a crude mechanism to rely on to resolve the disputes that can arise between 
benefciaries with an entitlement to land following a death on title. It results in 
the automatic transfer of ownership to the possessor without any consideration 
of the circumstances of the other benefciaries or their vulnerability to a claim 
when a family member goes into possession. It is submitted that the benefciaries 
133. See Woods, supra note 22, ch 4, part 2. Wylie is sceptical about this justifcation for the 
doctrine based on the notion that it makes a contribution to social problems such as 
homelessness. He notes: “As has become all too clear in recent times, homelessness is one of 
the most complex and intractable problems facing modern society and it is surely naïve to 
think that adverse possession is a solution to it.” See supra note 36 at 8. 
134. See Andrew Lyall, Land Law in Ireland, 3rd ed (Round Hall, 2010) at 990; JCW Wylie, 
Irish Land Law, 5th ed (Bloomsbury Professional, 2013) at para 23.42; RA Pearce, “Adverse 
Possession by the Next-of-Kin of an Intestate” (1987) 5 Ir L Times 281; Ireland, Law Reform 
Commission, Report on Reform and Modernisation of Land Law and Conveyancing Law (July 
2005) at 331-32. 
135. See Woods 2016, supra note 48. 
136. Ibid. 
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out of possession are in need of additional protection, and adequate alternative 
remedies exist to protect a benefciary in possession with a moral claim. 
Te doctrine of proprietary estoppel provides a much more stable basis for 
the grant of a remedy in such circumstances137 and also allows the court more 
fexibility in its response.138 If the child can prove an intention to create legal 
relations, consideration, and part performance, it may also be possible to prove 
that the deceased entered into a contract to leave a particular property to them 
by will.139 It should be noted that a child also has the option of bringing an 
application pursuant to section 117 of the Succession Act 1965, although such an 
application must be brought within six months of the extraction of the grant and 
is unavailable if the parent dies intestate.140 If the court is of the opinion that the 
testator has failed in their moral duty to make proper provisions for the child in 
accordance with their means, whether by will or otherwise, it may order that just 
provisions be made for the child out of the estate. In assessing the extent of that 
moral duty, the court will have regard to special circumstances, such as where 
“a child is induced to believe that by … working on a farm, he may ultimately 
become the owner of it, thereby causing him to shape his upbringing, training 
and life accordingly.”141 
C. THE ADVANTAGES OF A QUALIFIED VETO SYSTEM 
Te veto system of adverse possession is an efective—if not fool proof—method 
of enabling abandoned land to be brought back onto the market. It is submitted 
137. See Smyth v Halpin, [1997] 2 ILRM 38 (Ir) (in response to his father’s assurance that the 
family home would be his after his mother’s death and at his father’s suggestion, the son 
built an extension to the home at his own expense. When his father left the home to one 
of his daughters instead, the court ordered a conveyance of the house to the son pursuant 
to the doctrine of proprietary estoppel). See also Torner v Major, [2009] UKHL 18 (the 
court ordered the transfer of a farm into the name of the claimant who had worked on the 
deceased’s farm for 30 years without pay in reliance on oblique assurances made by the 
deceased that he would inherit it). 
138. In some circumstances, conferring a right of residence or awarding compensation may be 
more appropriate than an outright transfer of ownership. See Hillary Biehler, Equity and the 
Law of Trusts in Ireland, 6th ed (Round Hall, 2016), ch 18. 
139. See McCarron v McCarron, [1997] 2 ILRM 349 (Ir). 
140. Te Law Reform Commission has recently recommended that section 117 of the Succession 
Act 1965 should be extended to allow children to make an application where the parent 
died intestate. See Ireland, Te Law Reform Commission, Report on Section 117 of the 
Succession Act 1965: Aspects of Provision for Children (LRC 118-2017), para 3.54. See 
Succession Act, 1965 (IR), s 117. 
141. See McDonald v Norris, [2000] 1 ILRM 382 (Ir); C(X) v T(R) [2003] IEHC 6 (Ir); 
MH v NM, [1983] ILRM 519 (Ir). 
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that an owner cannot be assumed to have permanently relinquished any claim 
to land just because they have failed to use the land or bring an action to recover 
it during the limitation period, particularly in Ireland in light of the familial/ 
neighbourly context of the majority of adverse possession claims. Under a veto 
system of adverse possession, the owner is warned of the adverse possession 
application and the application will only proceed if the owner fails to exercise 
their veto within a specifed period of time. Although this system will, in most 
cases, efectively identify owners who intend to abandon the land, it is not perfect 
in this respect. Obviously, if the owner cannot be located (because of a failure to 
update their contact details on the Land Register), they will have been denied the 
protection of the veto and, consequently, an assumption cannot be reached about 
whether there was an intention to abandon the land. 
A qualifed veto approach is a very fexible method of refning the doctrine 
of adverse possession as the qualifcations to the veto can be fashioned to suit 
the valuable functions performed by the doctrine in any particular jurisdiction. 
Tree categories of “deserving” squatters are particularly noteworthy in the Irish 
context on the basis of the merits of their claim and/or for utilitarian reasons: (1) 
informal purchasers; (2) those who hold under a defective paper title; and (3) 
good faith possessors of a boundary strip.142 A squatter in possession under an 
informal or a defective title could be described as the “true” owner. Te informal 
purchaser would, in any event, be entitled to regularize their position by seeking an 
order for specifc performance of the contract for sale. A qualifcation to the veto 
system of adverse possession for such possessors would ensure that the doctrine is 
preserved as a pragmatic alternative remedy in certain circumstances.143 Although 
other remedies may be available, adverse possession is also regularly relied on 
to cure defects in title. Not only does this adverse possessor “deserve” to rely 
on the doctrine to quiet their title, the preservation of the doctrine’s function 
in this context is essential to the functioning of the unregistered conveyancing 
system.144 Finally, it is arguable that an adverse possessor of a boundary strip who 
reasonably believed that they owned the land in question may be regarded as 
“deserving” on the basis of their strong psychological attachment to it. However, 
it is submitted that the more convincing case for this qualifcation is based on 
142. See Woods, supra note 22, chs 4, 6, 8-9. 
143. A purchaser in possession must be able to prove that the licence granted by the vendor has 
been terminated expressly or by implication (e.g. if the entire purchase price has been paid) 
and that the limitation period has expired. For further discussion, see Woods, “Informal 
Purchasers,” supra note 120. 
144. See discussion below on this point. 
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the extent to which it protects purchasers and facilitates conveyancing in an 
environment where boundaries are typically non-conclusive.145 If Ireland is to 
introduce a qualifed veto system of adverse possession, we should also, I submit, 
retain our current “light touch” criminal response to peaceable squatting by 
adverse possessors who care for the property.146 An overview of the Irish criminal 
law in this area147 reveals that no criminal sanctions can be brought against the 
adverse possessors who I have just identifed as “deserving” and who should 
continue to beneft from the doctrine. 
D. THE EXTENSION OF THE QUALIFIED VETO SYSTEM TO UNREGISTERED 
LAND 
It is important to point out that I am not arguing that the reforms to the 
English law on adverse possession introduced by the Land Registration Act 2002
should be directly transplanted into Irish law. For example, I submit that it 
would be preferable to extend the veto system beyond registered land to include 
unregistered land. Te Law Commission of England and Wales argued in favour 
of retaining the existing law in relation to unregistered land on the basis that 
making it more difcult to acquire title by adverse possession of unregistered 
land could weaken the security of title to such land.148 Te Law Commission 
appears to have assumed that extending the veto system to unregistered land 
could damage the unregistered conveyancing system. Te Law Commission 
acknowledged that the existing law can produce harsh results but maintained that 
they are counterbalanced, in the context of unregistered land, by the essential role 
played by the doctrine in facilitating conveyancing.149 Te divergence between 
adverse possession of registered and unregistered land introduced by the English 
Land Registration Act 2002 is far from ideal and the reform of the doctrine need 
not necessarily lead to two diferent systems of adverse possession. Te Northern 
Ireland Law Commission has also expressed reservations about creating a situation 
of having the doctrine of adverse possession operate diferently depending on 
whether the land is registered or unregistered.150 
I have argued that a qualifed veto system of adverse possession could be 
extended to unregistered land in a manner that would not afect the functionality 
145. See generally Woods, “Te Undeserving and Deserving Squatter,” supra note 14. 
146. See Woods, supra note 22, ch 4, Part 1. 
147. Ibid. 
148. Law Com No 271, supra note 109 at para 14.2. 
149. Law Com No 254, supra note 19. 
150. Consultation Paper, supra note 27 at para 2.53. 
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of the unregistered conveyancing system and may even facilitate the extension of 
the registration of title system. In the case of unregistered land, it is proposed that 
the qualifed veto system would be administered by the Property Registration 
Authority151 on an application for frst registration based on long possession 
or frst registration of an unregistered title. Consequently, the reform would 
become relevant in the lead up to or following a transaction for value, which 
triggers the requirement for compulsory frst registration of title. In practice, this 
reform would mean that a person claiming a title based on adverse possession 
of unregistered land would be deprived of the ability to engage in a valuable 
transaction in relation to such land unless eforts are made to identify and 
protect the owner by allowing them to veto the adverse possession application. 
However, a qualifcation to the veto system would operate in the context of 
an application for frst registration of unregistered land based on an imperfect 
title (or “colour of title,” a concept from the United States) coupled with twelve 
years adverse possession. Te extension of the veto to unregistered land coupled 
with this exception to cater to defective titles would represent a fundamental 
distinction between the qualifed veto system of adverse possession that I propose 
for Ireland, and the system introduced in England and Wales that applies only 
to registered land and preserves the old law of adverse possession in relation to 
unregistered land.152 Tis approach would allow owners of unregistered land to 
beneft from the veto in the face of an adverse possession application,153 but also 
ensures that the registration of title system can ultimately be extended to the 
most uncertain of titles.154 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Lubetsky has pointed out that the doctrine of adverse possession and, consequently, 
the inconsistent use test may die a natural death once the province completely 
151. Te Property Registration Authority was established by through legislation to manage 
the Land Registry and the Registry of Deeds. See Registration of Deeds and Title Act
2006 (NI), ss 9-10. 
152. For further discussion, see Una Woods, “Adverse Possession, Unregistered Land and Title 
Defects: A Fly in the Ointment of Irish Reform?” in Heather Conway & Robin Hickey, eds, 
Modern Studies in Property Law, vol 9 (Hart, 2017) at 61. 
153. It may sometimes be difcult to identify the owner. In such circumstances, reasonable eforts 
would have to be made through the display of site notices and newspaper advertisements. For 
further discussion, see ibid. 
154. For further discussion, see ibid. 
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implements the Torrens Registered Title System.155 Section 51 of the Land Titles 
Act prohibits the acquisition of title by adverse possession in relation to land 
that has been registered.156 Although 99.9 per cent of titles in Ontario are now 
registered under the land title system, many of these titles were automatically 
converted in recent years without a proper investigation of title.157 Terefore, 
such titles were registered subject to qualifers, which specifcally preserve the 
rights of adverse possessors that had accrued prior to conversion. Before the title 
can be upgraded to absolute, the qualifer must be removed, and any adverse 
claims resolved. Alternatively, the adverse possessor may apply for registration 
on the basis of a pre-existing possessory title. As a result, I would submit that 
many years will pass before the doctrine of adverse possession is rendered 
redundant in Ontario. 
Although a prohibition on adverse possession of registered land has been 
introduced by the 1990 Act, it is not beyond the bounds of possibility that 
Ontario could be forced to reintroduce adverse possession in the future. It would 
not be possible in an article of this length to consider in any detail whether adverse 
possession should be re-introduced in Ontario in the context of registered land 
or how a qualifed veto system of adverse possession could be adapted to suit the 
needs of that particular jurisdiction. Ideally, this would require an investigation 
into how the doctrine operates in practice. It is possible, however, to draw certain 
tentative deductions based on the experience of other jurisdictions. Although 
it has, on occasion, been argued that adverse possession is inconsistent with a 
registered title system,158 in reality, there is no uniform consensus on how the 
doctrine should operate within a registered title context.159 
In addition, there is ample evidence to suggest that the approach taken by 
a particular jurisdiction may evolve as circumstances demand. New Zealand, 
and a number of Australian territories, which (like Ontario, Canada) operated a 
prohibition system of adverse possession were forced to re-introduce the doctrine 
to govern registered land to counteract marketability difculties that arose 
due to a culture of informal transactions and a high incidence of abandoned 
155. Lubetsky, supra note 5 at 508. 
156. RSO 1990, c L5. 
157. Tis took place as part of the POLARIS programme which involved the automation of all 
records in relation to land transactions and ownership. 
158. See Law Com No 254, supra note 19 at para 10.11. For a critique of this argument, see 
Una Woods, “Te English Law on Adverse Possession: A Tale of Two Systems” (2009) 38 
Common L World Rev 27 at 31-38. 
159. See generally Malcolm McKenzie Park, Te Efect of Adverse Possession on Part of Registered 
Title Land Parcel (PhD Tesis, University of Melbourne, 2003) [unpublished]. 
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land.160 Wylie has emphasized that the doctrine of adverse possession is equally 
as important in resolving conveyancing problems (e.g., informal transactions 
or boundary encroachments) in relation to registered land as it is in relation 
to unregistered land.161 Where land has been abandoned, awarding title to 
a resourceful squatter can be justifed as a pragmatic response to overarching 
societal concerns.162 Te squatter can be described as the most deserving recipient 
of the law’s bounty on the same basis that title is awarded to the frst possessor of 
unowned property or a fnder who takes possession of a chattel found lying on the 
ground.163 An alternative approach would be to award title to the State, as is the 
case with the estate of a deceased who dies without next of kin.164 However, the 
squatter is more likely to be aware that the land is abandoned and hence more 
motivated than the State to bring the land back into use and ultimately back 
onto the market.165 
Te main purpose of this article is to highlight that a qualifed veto system 
of adverse possession more efectively responds to the difculties that the 
inconsistent use test appears to be attempting to resolve. Te veto system ensures 
that the owner is warned about the danger of losing title, without reintroducing 
old notions of ouster or artifcially straining concepts of possession and intention. 
By allowing the owner to veto an adverse possession application, the owner’s 
authority to set an agenda for the land and to remain the owner without 
maintaining possession is respected. However, where the owner has abandoned 
the land and consequently fails to exercise their veto, this approach permits the 
vacancy in ownership to be flled. 
160. Ibid, ch 6. 
161. See Wylie, supra note 36 at 10. 
162. Recently, a number of US academics have justifed the doctrine on the basis that it operates 
in cases of imputed or constructive abandonment. See Christopher Meredith, “Imputed 
Abandonment: A Fresh Perspective on Adverse Possession and a Defence of the Objective 
Standard” (2010) 29 Miss CL Rev 257; Scott Shepard, “Adverse Possession, Private-Zoning 
Waiver & Desuetude: Abandonment & Recapture of Property and Liberty Interests” (2011) 
44 Mich JL Reform 557. 
163. See Armorie v Delamirie (1722), 93 ER 664; Parker v British Airways Board, [1982] 1 
All ER 834 (CA). 
164. See Succession Act 1965 (IR), s 73. 
165. If no squatter takes possession, in certain jurisdictions which levy property taxes, the 
state may ultimately acquire the right to sell the property for non-payment of such taxes. 
In Ireland, it is currently more likely that the bank would acquire this right due to a failure to 
make repayments on an outstanding secured loan. 
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It is submitted that adverse possession is not a “relic” or “an ailing concept,”166 
but a valuable feature of the modern Irish property law landscape. However, reform 
is overdue to address the doctrine’s inability to protect vulnerable owners from 
inadvertently losing title, particularly where a family member or a neighbour has 
taken possession. Tis article illustrates the positive impact that the introduction 
of a qualifed veto system in Ireland could have. In addition to conferring 
additional protection on such owners, a qualifed veto system allows the doctrine 
of adverse possession to continue to perform certain valuable functions. Tis is 
achieved through the formulation of exceptions or qualifcations that facilitate 
applications by specifed categories of claimant in spite of an objection by the 
owner. Tese qualifcations may be adapted to meet the particular needs of any 
jurisdiction but, in Ireland, it is possible to envisage a continuing role for the 
doctrine in regularizing informal or defective titles and resolving certain types of 
boundary disputes. 
166. See JCW Wylie, “Adverse Possession: An Ailing Concept?” (1965) 16 N Ir Leg Q 467 at 489; 
Wylie, supra note 36. 
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V. APPENDIX: IRISH CASE LAW 
Case Name Was the claim successful? 
Pre-existing 
relationship 
1 Martin v Kearney [1902] 36 ILTR 117 Yes Family 
2 Morteshed v Morteshed [1902] 36 ILTR 142 Yes Family 
3 Doyle v Foley [1903] 2 IR 95 Yes Family 
4 Smith v Savage [1906] 1IR 469 Yes Family 
5 Christie v Christie (1917) 1 IR 17 Yes Family 
6 Keelan v Garvey [1925] 1 IR 1 No Family 
7 In Re Loughlin [1942] 1 IR 15 No Family 
8 Murland and Smyth v Despard and Alton [1956] IR 170 Yes Family 
9 Vaughan v Cottingham [1961] 1 IR 184 No Family 
10 Ruddy v Gannon [1965] IR 283 Yes Family 
11 Browne v Fahy (HC, 24 October 1975) No Neighbours 
12 Perry v Woodfarm Holmes [1975] IR 104 Yes Neighbours 
13 Murphy v Murphy [1980] IR 183 Yes Family 
14 Bellew v Bellew [1982] IR 447 Yes Family/ Contractual 
15 Drohan v Drohan [1984] 1 IR 311 No Family 
16 Dundalk Urban District Council v Conway (HC, 15 December 1987) No Neighbours 
17 Seamus Durack Manufacturing Ltd v Considine[1987] IR 677 Yes Neighbours 
18 Cork Corporation v Lynch [1995] 2 ILRM 598 No Neighbours 
19 Doyle v O’Neill (HC, 13 January 1995) No (except for narrow strip) Neighbours 
20 Fanning v Jenkinson (HC, 2 July 1997) No Neighbours 
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Case Name Was the claim successful? 
Pre-existing 
relationship 
21 Gleeson v Feehan and Purcell [1997] 1 ILRM 522 Yes Family 
22 Grifn v Bleithin 1999] 2 ILRM 182 Yes Contractual 
23 Feehan v Leamy [2001] IEHC 23 No Neighbours 
24 Bula Ltd (in receivership) v Crowley [2003] 1 IR 396 No Contractual 
25 Fahy v Dillon [2005] 7 JIC 2913 No Neighbours 
26 Keelgrove Properties Ltd v Shelbourne Development Ltd [2005] IEHC 238 No Neighbours 
27 Tracey v Drury [2006] IEHC 381 No Neighbours 
28 Dunne v Iarnrod Eireann [2007] IEHC 314 No Neighbours 
29 Moley v Fee [2007] IEHC 143 No Contractual 
30 Mahon v O’Reilly [2010] IEHC 103 Yes Neighbours 
31 Moore v Moore [2010] IEHC 462 No Family 
32 Scanlon v Larkin [2011] IEHC 549 No Neighbours 
33 Gunning v Sherry [2012] IEHC 88 No Family 
34 O’Hagan v Grogan [2012] IESC 8 Yes Strangers 
